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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Commissioner's rulings. The expressed intent of the donor was to
make a gift and not to buy the composition. The plaintiff rendered
no services to the donor since the time and effort incidental to a com-
position of this type were expended before the contest was ever pro-
mulgated. The donor received no financial remuneration from the
contest; title to the composition remained in the plaintiff and the
donor received no pecuniary benefits from it. The plaintiff's expressed
motive for entering the contest was to make a contribution to the field
of music and coupled with that fact is the added factor that the compo-
sition was completed six years before the announcement of the con-
test. No other conclusion can be drawn except that the plaintiff entered
the contest for his expressly stated purpose.
Although it is doubtful the Commissioner will accede to the decision
in the instant case, yet to do otherwise would only serve to further
widen the gap between the courts and the Commissioner of Internal
lRevenue.
JohN J. WVrTAK
Workmen's Compensation-Effect Upon Prior Release of Em-
ployer's Election to Subscribe to Act-Claimant, an employee of The
Pocahontas Corporation, contracted silicosis in the second stage several
years before the employer elected to subscribe to the West Virginia
Workmen's Compensation Act. On October 6, 1940, claimant and his
employer entered into a compromise settlement by which the claimant
received $1,000, the amount then fixed by the act for that disability,
and the employer obtained a written release from the. claimant for
"all manner of . . . claims . . . for . . . injuries . . . ." Claimant con-
tinued in the employ of The Pocahontas Corporation. On June 15,
1943, the. employer elected to subscribe to the act. Claimant then sub-
mitted a claim to the compensation commissioner for the same dis-
ability mentioned above and was awarded $1,600, the amount then
allowed under the act. The Pocahontas Corporation set up the release as
satisfaction and discharge of the claim. The Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board, in December, 1949, reversed the order of the commis-
sioner, and claimant appealed. Held: Commissioner's order reinstated.
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, any contract or agreement
which exempts an employer or employee from the burden or waives
the benefit of the Act, is pro tanto void. Upon election to subscribe,
the employer elected to accept the obligations and burdens of the Act
as well as the benefits and protection thereof. It. in effect, waived any
defense created by the release or settlement insofar as it affected any
claim made under the Act. Vernon v. State Compensation Commis-
sioner et al., 61 S.E. (2) 243 (W.Va., 1950).
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RECENT DECISIONS
The case under consideration presents. a unique problem under the
workmen's compensation laws. Though no case dealing with this
question can be cited to support or rebut the decision found above,
consideration of a few well known principles of law may give a more
comprehensive answer to the problem.
The release involved was fully executed and the claim of the em-
ployee fully satisfied and extinguished before the employer subscribed
to the Act. At that time the Act was only applicable to the parties
in relation to certain common law defenses available to the employer.
The preponderance of authority holds that contracts relieving the em-
ployer of liability for employees' injuries to be received in'the future
are void as against public policy or statute, but those contracts which
are releases or settlements of existing demands are valid.' There is
no contention that the release was not valid or binding at the time it
was executed. Consequently, the release relinquished the claim to
the person against whom it might havebeen enforced, defeating the
cause of action.2 Generally, and under Wisconsin decisions,
"The agreement of settlement expressed in the written release
is, of course, a complete defense unless impeached by fraud or
mistake."3
The court admits that the release was a 'complete defense before the
employer subscribed to the Act, and if he withdraws from the opera-
tion of the Act, it would again act as such.
To uphold the court's decision, the Act must operate upon the
creation of the release, since no claim exists after the release is exe-
cuted. Consequently, that portion of the Act avoiding releases executed
by those finder the Act must be retroactive. Retroactive laws are not
generally favored since they act on past rights and liabilities, pro-
nouncing judgment on what has gone before, and are, therefore, in the
realm of the judicial rather than the strictly legislative field.4 The well
settled rule regarding retroactive operation of statutes is:
". ... statutes are not to be construed retrospectively, or to
have a retroactive effect, unless it shall clearly appear that it
was so intended by the legislature, and not even then, if such
construction would impair vested or constitutional rights."'
The Act gives no justification for holding it retroactive and, significant-
ly, the West Virginia court's past decisions declare that it is not
135 AM. JuR. 671.
2 Pellett v. Sonotone Corp. et al., 26 Cal. (2d) 705, 160 P. (2d) 783, 160 A.L.R.
863 (1945) ; 45 Am. JUR. 676.
aSteffen v. Supreme Assembly of The Defenders, 130 Wis. 485, 110 N.W. 401(1907).
4 25 R.C.L. 786.
5 State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 441- (1860) ; Seaman Y. Carter, 15 Wis. 548 (1862);
Building Height Cases, 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1933).
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retroactive.' In view of these past decisions the court's position in
this matter is difficult to understand. The assertion that the employer
waives the valuable right obtained under the release by the mere sub-
scription to the compensation fund is difficult to comprehend.
Recognition of this as valid violates that settled policy of the law
which forbids more than one complete satisfaction for the same wrong.
"The general rule is that when a plaintiff has accepted satis-
faction in full for an injury done him, from whatever source
it may come, he is so far affected in equity and good conscience
that the law will not permit him to recover again for the same
damages.117
Under the Wisconsin Act the payment of a benefit under the silicosis
feature estops the employee from further recovery from any employer
under that feature.- No protection against double compensation is
afforded those employers who have settled claims before coming
under the Act. If courts continue to hold that the compensation acts
do not apply to injuries received before the law went into effect,9
the need for such protection in the law itself is unnecessary. However,
if the decision of the West Virginia court presents a precedent to be
followed by others, the previously satisfied claim of every employee
similarly situated may be revived and paid in full by the employer.
Such a result is obviously unjust.
The aim sought in all the compensation acts is to limit litigation
and assure compensation for the loss of income regardless of the
question of certain common law defenses. If the recognized advantages
of the compensation acts are to be more widely accepted, the decision
under discussion cannot stand. It is hard to believe that an employer
would subscribe to the elective acts, or elect to subscribe to the com-
pulsory acts, upon the condition that settled claims would be paid again
by him on his election to come within the provisions of the acts. Such
an unjust penalty imposed on subscribers to the acts would only defeat
the purposes of the acts. Employers under the compulsory acts would
be faced with legally extinguished claims which they would have to
pay again. If releases and settlements are to be so lightly regarded,
as in this instance, no claim will be settled by non-subscribers until
it has been resolved after long litigation and becomes a matter of
record. Certainly the result reached in the principal case is unsound
in view of the prevailing principles of law.
WIILLAm H. BEZOLD
6 State ex rel. Conley v. Pennybacker, 131 V. Va. 442, 48 S.E. (2d)9 (1948).
McDonough v. National Hospital Ass'n. et al., 130 Ore. 451, 294 P. 351 (1930).
S Wis. STATs. (1949) Sec. 102.565 (6).9J 58 A.ma. JUR r. 599.
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